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SEVERING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SEX
TRAFFICKING AND U.S. MILITARY BASES
OVERSEAS
Anna Belle Hoots*
The sex trafficking of women and girls by U.S. military men remains an
issue plaguing U.S. military bases overseas. While the U.S. government has
offered several solutions to combat this specific niche of sex trafficking, the
legislation and policy put forth are insufficient to eradicate the problem.
After assessing the intersection of sex trafficking and overseas U.S. military
bases, this Note both discusses why and proposes how, through the use of
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), all U.S. military bases abroad can
and must commit to the prevention of this egregious human rights violation.
Because SOFAs grant wide latitude to set terms and foster cooperation
between the United States and a host country, this Note proposes a
framework for utilizing SOFAs as a channel for stricter guidelines and
greater enforceability of sex trafficking laws, specifically through the
inclusion of a new sex trafficking provision.
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INTRODUCTION
“Of the past 3,400 years, humans have been entirely at peace for 268 of
them, or just 8 percent of recorded history.”1 Perhaps this disconcerting
statistic illuminates why the tangible fear of war remains pervasive
throughout society.2 Indeed, such a deep-seated fear of conflict necessitates
a means to safeguard peace, and the installation of military bases around the
world emerged as a strategy to do so.3 As the country with the most military
bases abroad, the United States has certainly taken advantage of this practice,
with over 800 bases in nearly eighty foreign countries and territories,4 all
governed by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).5
This peacekeeping policy, however, has come at a price. While foreign
countries may find solace in a permanent U.S. presence,6 the benefits of

1. Chris Hedges, What Every Person Should Know About War, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/books/chapters/what-every-person-shouldknow-about-war.html [https://perma.cc/Y4JS-H275].
2. See Lily Rothman, Why Americans Are More Afraid Than They Used To Be, TIME
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4158007/american-fear-history [https://perma.cc/VGG52WMQ].
3. See MICHAEL J. LOSTUMBO ET AL., RAND, OVERSEAS BASING OF U.S. MILITARY
FORCES: AN ASSESSMENT OF RELATIVE COSTS AND STRATEGIC BENEFITS xxi–xxii (2013),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND_RR20
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGG9-J4KC].
4. See Cameron Orr, Peace Movement Reviving to Challenge U.S.’ Empire of Foreign
Bases, PEOPLE’S WORLD (Apr. 10, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/
peace-movement-reviving-to-challenge-u-s-empire-of-foreign-bases/
[https://perma.cc/
2FZR-93SX].
5. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENTS 1 (2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JMD6-E54E] (“[SOFAs] define the legal status of U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) personnel, activities, and property in the territory of another nation and set
forth rights and responsibilities between the United States and the host government.”).
6. See LOSTUMBO ET AL., supra note 3, at xxi–xxiii.

2019]

SEX TRAFFICKING AND U.S. SOFAS

735

American troops on their soil are being eclipsed by concerns over the human
rights abuses linked with these U.S. bases,7 particularly sex trafficking.8
A subset of human trafficking, sex trafficking is often equated with
modern-day slavery;9 it also remains the most common form of human
trafficking and disproportionately affects women and girls.10 Statistics
estimate that sex trafficking generates billions of dollars of profit per year,11
turning it into an extremely lucrative industry. But sex trafficking is a crime,
and one that often goes unnoticed.12 Indeed, victims are frequently reluctant
to come forward for a myriad of reasons, including “[l]anguage barriers, fear
of their traffickers, and/or fear of law enforcement.”13
A grave violation of human rights, sex trafficking is prohibited under both
domestic and international law.14 Recognizing the prevalence of sex
trafficking touching overseas U.S. military bases, the U.S. government
increased its anti-trafficking efforts by implementing training programs and
developing new policies and procedures for the military, civilian employees,
and contractors.15 After all, these bases—established to promote peace—
should not be a source for activity that produces human suffering. While
U.S. efforts are not futile, the issue is far from resolved.16 Illicit sexual

7. See Alice Slater, The US Has Military Bases in 80 Countries. All of Them Must Close.,
NATION (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-us-has-military-bases-in-172countries-all-of-them-must-close [https://perma.cc/A3FR-XPYP].
8. See Lindsey Posmanick, The Department of Defense’s Strategic Approach to Human
Trafficking, HUM. TRAFFICKING CTR. (Apr. 19, 2018), http://humantraffickingcenter.org/thedepartment-of-defenses-strategic-approach-to-human-trafficking
[https://perma.cc/U7JZBR6M].
9. See What Is Modern Slavery?, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/what-is-modernslavery [https://perma.cc/W3TV-HC2N] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
10. As of 2014, 51 percent of victims are women and another 20 percent are girls. See
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2016, at 23,
U.N. Sales No. E.16.IV.6 (2016).
11. See What Is Human Trafficking?, HUM. TRAFFICKING CTR., https://
humantraffickingcenter.org/problem [https://perma.cc/CFE3-FUK8] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019).
12. See What Is Human Trafficking?, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://
www.dhs.gov/blue-campaign/what-human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/Z82Y-FV4S] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019).
13. Id.
14. See G.A. Res. 55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000); see also G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov.
15, 2000) [hereinafter Palermo Protocol] (providing a universal definition of human
trafficking). To meet the universal definition, “three key elements” must be present: “(i)
action (recruitment, . . . ); (ii) means (threat, . . . ); and (iii) purpose (exploitation).” OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING: FACT
SHEET NO. 36, at 3 (2014), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS36_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KF6K-KLWK]. When the exploitation of an individual is sexual in nature,
then, it is considered a situation of sex trafficking. See id.
15. See Posmanick, supra note 8 (noting that “the U.S. military adopted a zero-tolerance
policy” following the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 22 (NSPD 22),
which “instruct[ed] federal agencies and the DoD, to strengthen their anti-trafficking efforts”).
16. See id.
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activities between male U.S. soldiers and women and girls17 abroad occur to
this day, continuing the troubling pattern that has persisted for decades.18
Part I provides relevant background material about the emergence and
purposes of U.S. military bases overseas and SOFAs and outlines the types
of SOFAs the United States holds with various nations. It also delves into
the history of sex trafficking involving U.S. military personnel assigned to
foreign bases.
Part II focuses on U.S. attempts to attenuate this connection through
specific policies and legislation. In analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
of these laws, Part II demonstrates the inability of such policies and
legislation to fully address the sex trafficking predicament around U.S.
military bases. Additionally, this section presents a case study of the sex
trafficking of women and girls around U.S. military bases in South Korea,
highlighting the U.S. and South Korean governments’ sovereign complicity
in establishing and fueling the exploitation of women and girls for the sexual
gratification of U.S. soldiers. This case study both illustrates how existing
U.S. legislation is ineffective and exemplifies the need for a nuanced and
targeted legal solution.
Part III then presents a resolution to the issue of sex trafficking around
U.S. military bases abroad. Acknowledging that the United States alone
cannot conquer this issue, this Note proposes a cooperative framework
utilizing SOFAs—specifically concerning jurisdiction to prosecute crimes—
between the United States and host countries to restrict sex trafficking by
U.S. military personnel. SOFAs allow for wide latitude to set terms and
foster cooperation between nations and should be used as a channel for
stricter guidelines and greater enforceability of sex trafficking laws through
the incorporation of provisions that implement the proposed cooperative
framework.
I. A (S)TALE(MATE) AS OLD AS TIME
Part I discusses the history of U.S. military bases overseas and explains
the rationale behind the creation of SOFAs. The United States has entered
into these agreements—of which there are many types—to primarily address
the jurisdictional issues that arise out of the placement of bases on foreign
soil. This section thus describes the existing jurisdictional frameworks
between the United States and host countries in SOFAs. In addition, Part I
provides an overview of the connection between sex trafficking and U.S.
military bases overseas.

17. Sex trafficking affects all genders. This Note, however, focuses solely on the sex
trafficking of women and girl victims by male U.S. soldiers.
18. See David Vine, Women’s Labor, Sex Work and U.S. Military Bases Abroad, SALON
(Oct. 8, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/10/08/womens-labor-sex-work-andu-s-military-bases-abroad [https://perma.cc/3C5J-U8YA] (“Throughout history, women’s sex
work has been used to help make male troops happy—or at least happy enough to keep
working for the military.”).
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A. The History of Overseas U.S. Military Bases and SOFAs
The establishment of overseas U.S. military bases dates back to the
Spanish-American War when the United States installed its first permanent
bases in the Far East and the Caribbean.19 Thereafter, U.S. military presence
abroad remained small.20 It was only after World Wars I and II that U.S.
overseas military bases experienced extreme growth; indeed, they began to
resemble their present-day setup and became “a more acceptable reality” for
all nations.21
As U.S. military bases overseas grew more common, so too did conflicts
implicating state sovereignty.22 The SOFA emerged as the resolution.23
SOFAs, which are “multilateral or bilateral agreements that generally
establish the framework under which a state’s military forces can operate in
a foreign country,”24 include numerous provisions25 but primarily govern
civil and criminal jurisdiction over bases and personnel.26 Following the
implementation of SOFAs, questions regarding state sovereignty have
greatly diminished and the establishment of U.S. military bases abroad has
become more regulated.27
B. The United States and SOFAs
The United States has more overseas military bases than any other
nation.28 Consequently, the United States is a party to more than one hundred
SOFAs.29 Around half of these agreements fall under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA or the Partnership for Peace30 SOFA,
19. See Addalyrica Q. George, US Military Overseas Bases—How They Began and the
Enduring Need for Forward Based United States’ Troops . . ., at 7 (Apr. 6, 2017) (unpublished
report), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038289.pdf [https://perma.cc/SUJ3-8XV4].
20. See id. at 8–9.
21. Bruna dos Santos Lersch & Josiane Simão Sarti, The Establishment of Foreign
Military Bases and the International Distribution of Power, 2 UFRGS MODEL UNITED
NATIONS J. 83, 85 (2014).
22. See id. at 88 (“‘Sovereignty . . . has been described as a right to exercise therein, to
the exclusion of any other state, the function of a state . . . .’ In other words, the principle of
sovereignty of a state clashes with the implementation of military bases belonging to other
countr[ies] inside another one’s territory.” (quoting Geert van Calster, International Law and
Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 105
(Aaron Schwabach & Arthur John Cockfield eds., 2009))); see also Andrew I. Yeo, Security,
Sovereignty, and Justice in U.S. Overseas Military Presence, INT’L J. PEACE STUD., Winter
2014, at 43, 43–44 (“From Spain and Portugal to South Korea and the Philippines, dozens of
host governments that signed basing or status of forces agreements (SOFAs) with the U.S.
during the early Cold War years, negotiated for greater sovereignty rights over time.”).
23. See Lersch & Sarti, supra note 21, at 88.
24. Id. at 89.
25. See id. (“[O]ther provisions dealing with subjects such as taxes and fees, test-ranges
for weaponry and number of troops are also included in the SOFA’s scope.”).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 88–89.
28. See Orr, supra note 4.
29. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 5, at 1.
30. See id.; see also R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34531, STATUS OF
FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 2 (2012) (“The
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whereas the rest are either comprehensive or less comprehensive agreements
formed through negotiations with long-standing U.S. allies or other nations.31
Indeed, existing SOFAs differ immensely and are shaped according to
negotiations because there is no formal document that promulgates
international guidelines for these agreements.32 Notwithstanding SOFA
diversity, civil and criminal jurisdiction remain the most foundational aspects
of these agreements.33 While each SOFA’s jurisdictional framework often
encompasses both civil and criminal matters,34 this Note focuses on the more
contentious issue of criminal jurisdiction, specifically as it relates to sex
trafficking.
Although the majority of U.S. SOFAs provide for “shared jurisdiction
between the United States and the [host] country,” there exist agreements
pursuant to which the United States retains exclusive jurisdiction.35 In
exclusive jurisdiction agreements, the United States has the power to exercise
“all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction” over U.S. military personnel who
violate the laws of either the United States or the host country.36 Shared
jurisdiction, on the other hand, grants the United States and the host country
exclusive jurisdiction over certain offenses, typically according to which
country punishes the offense.37 Under these circumstances, “the country
whose law has been offended has exclusive jurisdiction over the offender.”38
If U.S. personnel break the laws of both the United States and the host
country, “additional qualifications are used to” decide which country retains
the right to exercise jurisdiction.39
Most U.S. SOFAs require the United States to relinquish “primary
jurisdiction”40 in criminal cases to the host country with two exceptions: (1)
“[w]hen the offense is committed by Americans against Americans (‘inter
se’ cases)” and (2) “when the offense is committed by Americans in carrying
out official duty.”41 These exceptions give the United States primary
NATO SOFA is a multilateral agreement that has applicability among all the member
countries of NATO. . . . Additionally, another 24 countries are subject to the NATO SOFA
through their participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The program
consists of bilateral cooperation between individual countries and NATO to increase stability,
diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships.” (footnote omitted)).
31. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 5, at 1–3 (detailing the variation among
SOFAs between the United States and other countries).
32. See Lersch & Sarti, supra note 21, at 89.
33. See MASON, supra note 30, at 3.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Primary jurisdiction gives the host country power to exercise jurisdiction for all cases
in which U.S. military personnel violate its laws. See Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA],
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm [https://
perma.cc/2M56-9DW6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
41. Id.; see, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding
the Status of Their Forces art. 7.3, June 19, 1951, 4.2 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67
[hereinafter NATO SOFA].
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jurisdiction over its accused military members.42 In addition to the stated
exceptions, the shared jurisdiction regime requires the host country to
consider any U.S. requests for the host country to waive its primary
jurisdiction.43 In general, the United States has the right to exert jurisdiction
over criminal activity of U.S. personnel both on and off base, which can
completely immunize a military member from the host country’s laws.44
Through SOFA provisions governing jurisdiction, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) is able “to protect, to the maximum extent possible, the rights
of United States personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign
courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons.”45
C. The Connection Between Sex Trafficking and U.S. Military Bases
Overseas: An Overview
The link between sex trafficking and U.S. military bases overseas is not a
new phenomenon.46 To this day, U.S. military personnel frequent bars off
base and out of uniform where women and girls are trafficked into forced
prostitution.47 These individuals have fallen victim to sex trafficking through
a variety of means, from being manipulated by a loved one to being baited
with false pretenses such as a job.48 Victims are most frequently found in
fake massage businesses, residential brothels, bars, and strip clubs.49 Despite
both this reality and the high number of estimated victims and cases
worldwide, prosecution rates in sex trafficking cases remain low.50 This
shocking disparity may stem partly from the victims’ shame and fear of
coming forward or, more generally, from a lack of good enforcement
mechanisms.
Efforts to crack down on human trafficking began when President Bill
Clinton signed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 200051 (TVPA),
“the first comprehensive federal law” designed to address trafficking in
42. See Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA], supra note 40.
43. See, e.g., NATO SOFA, supra note 41, 4.2 U.S.T. at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 76–78.
44. See MASON, supra note 30, at 3–5.
45. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5525.1, STATUS OF FORCES POLICY AND INFORMATION
2 (1979), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/552501p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UA8-RGH2].
46. See Vine, supra note 18; see also Dan Lamothe, The U.S. Military’s Long,
Uncomfortable History with Prostitution Gets New Attention, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/10/31/the-u-s-militarys-longuncomfortable-history-with-prostitution-gets-new-attention [https://perma.cc/D49G-X4F6].
47. See Posmanick, supra note 8.
48. These jobs are often disguised as modeling or dancing careers. See, e.g., Sex
Trafficking, POLARIS, https://polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/sex-trafficking [https://
perma.cc/RH2R-Q7WJ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
49. See id.; Hostess/Strip Club-Based, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE, https://
humantraffickinghotline.org/sex-trafficking-venuesindustries/hostessstrip-club-based
[https://perma.cc/69KK-WM7U] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
50. See Human Trafficking by the Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 7, 2017), https://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-trafficking-numbers
[https://perma.cc/CXG6GQYZ].
51. See Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
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persons.52 While additional strategies and legislation designed to correct this
problem have since been formed and passed,53 there is a gap between these
policies as written and as practiced. Considering not only the continued
prevalence of U.S. military bases worldwide but also their entrenchment in
society,54 the deplorable connection between U.S. military bases overseas
and sex trafficking has faced considerably less scrutiny than it deserves.
II. LAW AND (DIS)ORDER
The U.S. government has attempted to curb sex trafficking around U.S.
military bases abroad through policies and legislation aimed at both the
general population at large and military personnel specifically. Part II.A
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of these laws and explains why—
despite improvement—they fall short of adequately addressing the sex
trafficking crisis around U.S. military bases. Part II.B then presents a case
study of the sex trafficking of women and girls around U.S. military bases in
South Korea. By visiting bars and clubs where women and girls are
trafficked into forced prostitution, U.S. personnel stationed in South Korea
knowingly perpetuate the vicious sex trade cycle. In recent years, both the
U.S. and South Korean governments have attempted to remedy the issue to
no avail. U.S. military personnel in South Korea will continue to participate
in the sex trade until a viable resolution is created and enforced.
A. The U.S. Government’s Attempts to Curb Sex Trafficking Around U.S.
Overseas Military Bases
Tasked with the responsibility of keeping the United States safe and
secure, the U.S. government—specifically the DoD—oversees a vast
military.55 As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president is the
ultimate authority for military operations,56 but the DoD is authorized to
ensure that military personnel abide by the law and ethics of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)—the statutory framework of the military
justice system.57 It is important to distinguish, however, that while the
UCMJ outlines the substantive law governing the conduct of all military
52. Federal
Law,
NAT’L
HUM.
TRAFFICKING
HOTLINE,
https://
humantraffickinghotline.org/what-human-trafficking/federal-law
[https://perma.cc/E237ZKZL] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
53. See discussion infra Part II.A.
54. See, e.g., Joseph Hincks, Inside Camp Humphreys, South Korea: America’s Largest
Overseas Military Base, TIME (July 12, 2018), http://time.com/5324575/us-camp-humphreyssouth-korea-largest-military-base/ [https://perma.cc/YJD2-6BAN].
55. See
generally
Department
of
Defense,
PERFORMANCE.GOV,
https://
www.performance.gov/defense/defense.html [https://perma.cc/FP6J-W7NS] (last updated
Sept. 19, 2019).
56. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
57. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012); The Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), MILITARY, https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/
the-uniform-code-of-military-justice-ucmj.html [https://perma.cc/8CTU-NWK4] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019) (“The UCMJ defines the military justice system and lists criminal offenses under
military law.”).
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personnel, a SOFA outlines civil and criminal personal jurisdiction over
personnel stationed overseas.58
In recent years, the DoD has denounced sex trafficking in the harshest
terms.59 Together with presidential leadership and various federal agencies,
the DoD has enacted a “multi-pronged anti-trafficking approach” to prohibit
military personnel from eliciting sexual services.60 Their combined efforts
certainly paid off in late 2005, when patronizing prostitution and pandering
became a “specific, chargeable offense” under Article 134 of the UCMJ.61
Notwithstanding this provision, the United States still faces challenges in
preventing and prosecuting sex trafficking crimes around U.S. military bases
under the current legislative framework. The merits and limitations of
legislation designed to address this issue are discussed in turn.
1. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
On October 28, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the TVPA into law,62
symbolizing the U.S. effort to spearhead the eradication of trafficking both
domestically and worldwide.63 Designed to “ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims,”64 the TVPA prohibits
various forms of human trafficking and creates resources for its elimination
through three methods: protection, prosecution, and prevention.65 The U.S.
Department of State recently introduced a “4th P” to the “3P” paradigm—
partnership—emphasizing the importance of cooperation within the
government and the international community.66
At the time of the TVPA’s passage, members of the international
community, including the United States, had just finished drafting the
Palermo Protocol, which clearly defined sex trafficking67 and provided for
58. See discussion supra Part I.B.
59. See, e.g., Terri Moon Cronk, Human Trafficking Has No Place in DoD, Pentagon
Official Says, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/
1414057/human-trafficking-has-no-place-in-dod-pentagon-official-says
[https://perma.cc/
DJR5-X92W].
60. See Trafficking in Persons and International Military Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST.
(Feb. 22, 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/07/82340.htm [https://perma.cc/
X73D-RLGW].
61. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,387, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,697, 60,701 (Oct. 14, 2005).
62. See Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations
FY 2017, ALLIANCE TO END SLAVERY & TRAFFICKING (Jan. 11, 2017, 8:40 AM), https://
endslaveryandtrafficking.org/summary-trafficking-victims-protection-act-tvpareauthorizations-fy-2017-2/ [https://perma.cc/X5VR-FX9F].
63. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012); see also Brittany Lieu, A Policy Analysis of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, at 34 (May 2014) (unpublished M.S.W.
dissertation, California State University, Long Beach), https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/
pubnum/1527722.html?FMT=AI [https://perma.cc/F78K-XCTX].
64. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a).
65. See 3Ps:
Prosecution, Protection, and Prevention, U.S. DEP’T ST.,
https://www.state.gov/3ps-prosecution-protection-and-prevention [https://perma.cc/G8TFQ5PK] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
66. See id.
67. See Palermo Protocol, supra note 14, at 42–43 (“(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall
mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
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its criminalization.68 The TVPA both implemented the protocol and filled
gaps in U.S. law.69 The scope of the Act, nevertheless, reaches far beyond
the United States.70 In outlining minimum standards that each government
in countries of “origin, transit, or destination” should implement,71 the U.S.
government sought to eliminate sex trafficking on a global scale.72
Efforts to combat sex trafficking have undoubtedly accelerated since the
TVPA’s enactment.73 Most notably, there has been a measurable increase in
prosecutions—a critical anti-trafficking effort.74 Prosecutions not only lead
to the punishment of the offense of exploiting other human beings but also
improve deterrence.75 In the years preceding the TVPA, sentences for sex
trafficking were weak penalties that did not reflect the gravity of the crime.76
Upon the Act’s passage, anyone caught trafficking an individual who was
induced by force, fraud, or coercion for purposes of commercial sex could be
fined and imprisoned for life, depending on the severity of the offense.77
From 2011 to 2015, the number of sex trafficking suspects referred to U.S.
attorneys for prosecution increased 82 percent.78 In 2015 alone, U.S.
attorneys prosecuted 1049 suspects for human trafficking offenses—a 44
percent increase from the 729 suspects prosecuted in 2011—and almost all
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (b) The consent of a victim
of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used . . . .”).
68. See Michelle Madden Dempsey et al., Defining Sex Trafficking in International and
Domestic Law: Mind the Gaps, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 137, 138 (2012).
69. See Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations
FY 2017, supra note 62.
70. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7106–7107 (2012) (explaining that governments of other countries
face consequences for failing to comply with the TVPA).
71. Id. § 7106(a). These minimum standards include prohibiting severe forms of
trafficking, prescribing punishments equivalent to the crime, and making efforts to eliminate
trafficking. See id.
72. See id. § 7107. To ensure compliance, the United States forfeits any form of financial
assistance—excepting humanitarian and trade-related aid—to governments that fail to meet
the minimum standards. See id. Despite U.S. intentions, it remains unclear whether the
minimum standard provisions truly have any bite. See generally Janie Chuang, The United
States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 437 (2006).
73. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
crt/legacy/2010/12/14/tvpaanniversaryreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7C2-CYWT].
74. See id. at 5–8; Lieu, supra note 63, at 43–44.
75. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 5.
76. See Lieu, supra note 63, at 32–34.
77. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7102(9)(a), 7109.
78. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Human Trafficking Prosecutions
Increased More Than 40 Percent from 2011 to 2015 (June 25, 2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fphtc15pr.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XWS-UBJ3] (“This
report presents statistics on . . . human trafficking offenses covered by the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 and Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015.”).
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of the convicted defendants received a prison sentence, with a median term
of fifteen years.79
The TVPA’s anti-trafficking efforts also gleaned success through
Congress’s creation of T nonimmigrant status (T visa).80 From a protection
standpoint, the T visa has been crucial in providing refuge for victims of sex
trafficking around the world.81 By allowing sex trafficking victims and their
immediate family members to remain and work temporarily in the United
States—typically if they agree to help law enforcement prosecute the
perpetrators—these survivors gain legal nonimmigrant status and are eligible
to receive federal benefits.82 This accessible grant of protection can offer a
much-needed fresh start for victims. Indeed, the number of T visa applicants
has steadily increased over the years since 2008.83 Between 2008 and 2015,
6087 victims applied for T visas; of those, 4305 applicants were approved.84
Despite significant progress in combatting sex trafficking, weaknesses in
the TVPA have yet to be addressed. Since 2000, Congress reauthorized the
TVPA in 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, and 2017 with modifications.85 These
changes were intended to reflect what the original TVPA did not account
for.86 Yet what the TVPA lacked, and still lacks, is the ability to counteract
the sex trafficking of women and girls by U.S. military personnel off base,
where the criminal activity actually takes place. Whereas trafficking crimes
that occur on base are prosecutable through the TVPA and UCMJ, off-base
offenses are not.87 If the TVPA’s mission truly were to eliminate sex
trafficking worldwide, its failure to even acknowledge this problem would

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b); Lieu, supra note 63, at 43.
See Lieu, supra note 63, at 44.
See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b); Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-humantrafficking-other-crimes/victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status
[https://perma.cc/26L7-HQNT] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
83. See Number of I–914 Applications for T Nonimmigrant Status (Victims of Severe
Forms of Trafficking and Family Members) by Fiscal Year, Quarter, and Case Status 2008–
2016, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Victims/I91
4t_visastatistics_fy2016_qtr2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5HG-WXNU] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019)
[hereinafter Applications for T Nonimmigrant Status]. In 2018, President Donald Trump
announced that persons who are denied a T visa will immediately be placed in removal
(deportation) proceedings. See Daniel Shoer Roth, The U.S. Now Has Even More Leeway to
Start Deportation Proceedings for Immigrants, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 15, 2018, 2:08 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article221655960.html
[https://perma.cc/2MPG-RCD9]. The new measure took effect on November 19, 2018. See
id. Statistics have yet to be released reflecting any decline in number of T visa applicants.
84. See Applications for T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 83.
85. See Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations
FY 2017, supra note 62 (discussing the evolution of the TVPA since its enactment in 2002).
86. See id.
87. Under existing SOFAs, the United States does not have jurisdiction to prosecute sex
trafficking offenses that occur on foreign soil off base unless the host country waives its
primary jurisdiction. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., NATO
SOFA, supra note 41, 4.2 U.S.T. at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 76–78.
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be a huge oversight. Perhaps the issue requires a customized solution beyond
the relative generality of the TVPA.88
2. National Security Presidential Directive 22
On December 16, 2002, President George W. Bush—in his role as
commander in chief—issued National Security Presidential Directive 22
(NSPD 22), which orders federal agencies to improve and build upon their
current anti-trafficking efforts.89 Declaring the United States’ commitment
“to the eradication of human trafficking both domestically and abroad,” the
U.S. government took another step towards severing the link between sex
trafficking and U.S. overseas military bases.90 NSPD 22 established a “zerotolerance” policy towards trafficking in persons among members of the U.S.
armed forces,91 aptly adopting a narrowly tailored approach to eliminate a
specific niche of sex trafficking.
In NSPD 22, the president directs all relevant U.S. government agencies,
including the DoD, to develop a strategic plan to combat trafficking in
persons abroad.92 This includes efforts to raise awareness about and
eliminate sex trafficking through mandated training.93 NSPD 22 also
enforces the law against those who knowingly participate in and patronize
trafficking networks.94 As explained in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2200.01,
which implements NSPD 22, trafficking in persons not only violates U.S.
law and human rights but also thwarts the DoD’s core values.95
Passing NSPD 22 has resulted in several noteworthy victories for the
DoD.96 In 2015, 90 percent of military members and civilian employees
participated in human trafficking awareness training, an increase of 18
88. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
(CTIP) 2014–2018, at 5–6, https://ctip.defense.gov/Portals/12/Documents/Strategic_Plan_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4G5-JNUB] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“The TVPA and its
several reauthorizations . . . stress the role governments can play in eradicating trafficking in
persons in all aspects, ranging from incorporating mandatory ‘zero-tolerance’ anti-trafficking
clauses into all government contracts, to empowering vulnerable populations by informing
them of their rights under both national and local laws.”) (emphasis added)).
89. See National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-22, Memorandum from the
President on Combating Trafficking in Persons 1 (Dec. 16, 2002), https://ctip.defense.gov/
Portals/12/Documents/NSPD-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EBH-6SQM] [hereinafter NSPD].
90. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Trafficking in Persons
National Security Presidential Directive (Feb. 25, 2003), https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030225.html
[https://perma.cc/F8J3SYHR ].
91. See NSPD, supra note 89, at 4.
92. See id. at 3.
93. See id. at 4.
94. See id. at 2.
95. DoDI 2200.01—which has been reissued three times since 2007—states that DoD
opposes prostitution, forced labor, and any related activities contributing to the phenomenon
of trafficking in persons. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2200.01: COMBATING
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (CTIP) (2017), https://ctip.defense.gov/Portals/12/Documents/
DoDI%20220001p.pdf?ver=2018-02-23-112018-570 [https://perma.cc/KC9A-XNPZ].
96. See generally Combating Trafficking in Persons, U.S. DEP’T DEF., https://
ctip.defense.gov [https://perma.cc/NS8R-P94P] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
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percent from 2008.97 DoD personnel are now better equipped to recognize
and report signs of trafficking both on and off base, which in turn has
increased identification of trafficking victims.98 Further, establishments
suspected of involvement with prostitution and human trafficking have been
placed off-limits to U.S. personnel.99 Working with local governments and
law enforcement, the DoD has attempted to curtail U.S. troops’ patronage of
these establishments and, as a result, tighten its zero-tolerance policy.100
Much like the TVPA, however, NSPD 22 needs considerable refinement.
Notwithstanding heightened awareness and stricter policy, investigations
into sex trafficking crimes around U.S. military bases abroad suggest that
something more is required.101 In fact, the DoD’s continued efforts to adopt
new and improved approaches to NSPD 22—like the Strategic Action Plan—
corroborate this proposition.102
3. The DoD’s Strategic Action Plan
In 2014, the DoD issued its five-year Strategic Action Plan to end human
trafficking, supplementing NSPD 22.103 Created by the Combating
Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Program, the Strategic Action Plan responded
to an investigative report by the Office of Inspector General, which found the
DoD’s compliance with DoDI 2200.01 inadequate.104 In adopting the
report’s recommendations, the U.S. military has utilized the Strategic Action
Plan to combat sex trafficking over the past several years.105
While merely a vision, the Strategic Action Plan has come closer to
addressing the problem of sex trafficking around military bases overseas than
the TVPA and NSPD 22. Indeed, the plan’s first-listed guiding principle is
the “[reduction of] risk and incidence of trafficking in persons within DoD’s
garrison and deployed military operations.”106 Highlighting a neglected
problem area, the Strategic Action Plan provides a roadmap for what needs
to be done to reduce trafficking in persons in the twenty-first century,
including around military bases overseas.107

97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
101. See, e.g., Nat’l Ctr. on Sexual Exploitation, Inextricably Bound: The Link Between
the Military, Strip Clubs, Prostitution, and Human Trafficking, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RMdqX7V0sMY [https://perma.cc/RXF5-MN5L].
102. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
103. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88.
104. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. DODIG-2014-079, EVALUATION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS PROGRAM 11 (2014),
https://media.defense.gov/2014/Jun/16/2001713368/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2014-079.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZRP6-ELFB].
105. See Posmanick, supra note 8.
106. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 8 (emphasis added).
107. See id. at 3.
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The Strategic Action Plan’s objectives generally revolve around improved
partnership—the “4th P”—and with good reason.108 As a global issue, sex
trafficking cannot be fought solely by one country, especially when it
involves the interests of two or more. The United States therefore recognizes
the importance of cooperation with other countries and government agencies
as a foundation for preventing trafficking.109 The Strategic Action Plan
defines the DoD’s duty to understand the host country’s local laws because
“improved mutual understanding will enable joint programs and law
enforcement efforts.”110 Although a step in the right direction, the Strategic
Action Plan lacks implementation procedures and is thus ineffective.111
Indeed, the DoD has yet to publish an implementation plan that sets its vision
in motion, and a plan without implementation is merely aspirational.
Overall, the United States has taken great strides in combating sex
trafficking since enacting the TVPA. Upon the recognition of the U.S.
military as a contributing source, the United States began to pursue
legislation specifically targeting the sex trafficking of women and girls by
male U.S. military personnel stationed overseas.112 Despite increased
awareness of and additional policies concerning the issue, the U.S.
government has yet to create and implement a permanent solution. What has
instead resulted from the TVPA, NSPD 22, and Strategic Action Plan is a
collective blueprint for eliminating sex trafficking around U.S. military bases
abroad that lacks enforceability.
B. A Case Study of South Korea
To highlight the inadequacies of existing frameworks, this section explores
a country notorious for the commingling of U.S. military personnel and
prostitutes: South Korea. Because sex trafficking around U.S. military bases
has deep roots in South Korea, this subsection provides a concrete example
of the ongoing human rights violations being committed against women and
girls who are forced into prostitution. Additionally, this section surveys the
efforts of the U.S. and South Korean governments to curtail sex trafficking,
as well as more recent developments concerning this issue.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 5.
See id. at 3.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 3.
See supra Parts II.A.1–3.

2019]

SEX TRAFFICKING AND U.S. SOFAS

747

1. The Beginnings of Sex Trafficking Around U.S. Military Bases in South
Korea
Women like me were the biggest sacrifice for my country’s alliance with
the Americans. Looking back, I think my body was not mine, but the
government’s and the U.S. military’s.
—Anonymous sex worker113

Beginning in 1945,114 American soldiers stationed in Korea turned to
prostitution for comfort from both loneliness and the terrors of war.115 Both
the U.S. and South Korean governments shamelessly condoned this
behavior.116 By setting up “comfort stations” in camptowns—prostitution
camps that catered to U.S. forces—compelling “entertaining girls” to be
checked and treated for sexually transmitted diseases, and providing sex
workers the opportunity to learn English and etiquette, these governments
jointly fueled the sex industry.117
As South Korea struggled to emerge from war, prostitution became
integral to the country’s economic revitalization.118 Following the signing
of the 1953 mutual defense treaty, camptowns flourished.119 “By 1958, there
were an estimated 300,000 sex workers in a country with an entire population
of just 22 million,” more than half of whom worked in camptowns.120 These
South Korean sex workers relied almost entirely on U.S. military personnel
for their livelihoods, often remaining in camptowns for the duration of their
lives with no opportunity to escape.121 Another popular practice among U.S.
soldiers during this time was “cohabitating marriage,” which was nothing

113. WITW Staff, How U.S. Bases in Korea Viciously Fuel the Sex Industry, WOMEN
WORLD (Nov. 6, 2015), https://womenintheworld.com/2015/11/06/how-u-s-bases-in-southkorea-viciously-fuel-the-sex-industry [https://perma.cc/Z6GR-6DEL].
114. In 1945, U.S. forces arrived in southern Korea to liberate the country from Japanese
control. See American Troops Arrive in Korea to Partition the Country, HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/american-troops-arrive-in-korea-to-partitionthe-country [https://perma.cc/RX5R-UJZL] (last updated July 27, 2019). Although the U.S.
occupation was supposed to be temporary—with the hope that Korea would “decide its own
political future” following independence—it ultimately became permanent. Id. Indeed,
Korea’s situation worsened rather than improved, and sporadic conflict between the North and
South led to the outbreak of the Korean War. See id. The Korean War officially divided the
country into two regions: Soviet-aligned North Korea and U.S.-aligned South Korea. See id.
Ever since the split, the United States has maintained a military presence in South Korea,
founded on a 1953 mutual defense treaty. See U.S. Relations with the Republic of Korea, U.S.
DEP’T ST. (July 17, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm [https://perma.cc/
V87L-NRPY].
115. See WITW Staff, supra note 113.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See David Vine, ‘My Body Was Not Mine, but the US Military’s,’ POLITICO (Nov. 3,
2015, 5:30 AM), https://www.politico.eu/article/my-body-was-not-mine-but-the-u-smilitarys [https://perma.cc/KLJ3-CTH7] (“In the 1950s alone, 18 new camptowns were
created.”).
120. Id.
121. See id.
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more than sex slavery.122 Whereas some sex workers would come and go
from the camptown as part of a routine, others were owned by G.I.s, living
with them permanently.123 In the latter circumstance, when the G.I.
eventually left South Korea, he would simply sell the sex worker to a new
recruit.124 But regardless of whether a sex worker was in a cohabitating
marriage or “free” to come and go, the woman lacked any control or
autonomy.
Conditions worsened when a military junta usurped the South Korean
government in a 1961 coup d’etat.125 Shortly thereafter, Korean officials
designated “special districts” for businesses catering to U.S. troops.126 These
legally recognized districts were strictly off-limits to Koreans, and American
military police dominated the districts, allowing prostitution to run
rampant.127 By 1965, “85 percent of [G.I.s] surveyed reported having ‘been
with’ or ‘been out with’ a prostitute.”128
Ultimately, a stunt so clear in the public eye could not avoid scrutiny. In
recent years, investigations into and exposés on this stark reality have
revealed the openly intertwined nature of prostitution and American military
bases overseas, inducing both the U.S. and South Korean governments to
clamp down on the industry;129 for example, South Korea outlawed
prostitution in 2004.130 Instead of disappearing, however, prostitution has
only become more shrouded in secrecy.131
2. The Current Trend of Sex Trafficking Around U.S. Military Bases in
South Korea
In the mid-1990s, South Korea underwent a period of rapid economic
development, allowing many Korean women to both escape and stay out of
122. Id. (“‘Cohabitating marriage,’ resembling European-style colonial concubinage, also
became popular.”).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. In 1961, Park Chung-hee, a politician and general, led a successful coup
against the South Korean government. See Michael Breen, Gen. Park Chung-hee’s May 16
Coup and Rise of Military Regime, KOREA TIMES (May 16, 2010, 3:55 PM), http://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/117_65949.html
[https://perma.cc/
YW9Z-D8C3].
126. See Na Young Lee, The Construction of U.S. Camptown Prostitution in South Korea:
Trans/formation and Resistance 119 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Maryland, College Park), https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/4162/umi-umd3959.pdf;sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/KYG8-DJ84].
127. See Vine, supra note 119.
128. See id. (“American military police could arrest sex workers without health inspection
cards, and U.S. doctors treated women with sexually transmitted diseases at detention centers
given names such as ‘the monkey house.’”).
129. See id.; see also, e.g., Barbara Demick, Off-Base Behavior in Korea, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
26, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/26/world/fg-barwomen26 [https://perma.cc/
AU59-NUEG]; Jon Rabiroff, Report on Human Trafficking Cites South Korean Juicy Bars,
STARS & STRIPES (June 18, 2010), https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/report-on-humantrafficking-cites-south-korean-juicy-bars-1.107610 [https://perma.cc/5YEQ-JQX9].
130. See Vine, supra note 119.
131. See id.
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prostitution.132 But where there is demand, there will always be supply.
Indeed, “one of the many legacies of conflict has been South Korea becoming
a destination for trafficked women, and the sex industry continues to hold a
poisonous grip on the nation.”133 South Korea’s camptowns now consist
primarily of women from Russia and the Philippines134 who enter the country
on entertainment visas.135 Lured to South Korea under false pretenses,136
these women often emigrate in anticipation of a lucrative job and stability
but are instead forced to engage in prostitution at “juicy bars.”137 Caught
between a rock and a hard place, the women must either risk being arrested
and deported or endure the abuse since there is a slim chance that an
American soldier will marry them out of prostitution.138
The U.S. and South Korean governments ultimately faced growing
criticism and pressure for change, which led to several positive developments
concerning sex trafficking. In 2004, South Korea not only outlawed
prostitution139 but also passed the Act on the Prevention of Commercial Sex
Acts and Protection, etc. of Victims, which further regulated the sex
industry.140 Together, the two new laws recognized prostitution as a
violation of women’s human rights and demanded its total elimination.141
132. See WITW Staff, supra note 113.
133. Id.
134. Stephen Evans, Did Korea Encourage Sex Work at US Bases?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30212673 [https://perma.cc/3J69-27AH].
135. See Press Release, Int’l Org. for Migration, South Korea’s Entertainment Visas Pose
Risk of Human Trafficking: Policy Forum (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/southkoreas-entertainment-visas-pose-risk-human-trafficking-policy-forum
[https://perma.cc/
9ZJZ-ABBF].
136. While there are legitimate forms of the entertainment visa, such as the E-6-2 visa, it
is often utilized as a vehicle to trick immigrant women into prostitution. See Um Ji-won, S.
Korea Still Failing to Effectively Fight Human Trafficking, HANKYOREH (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/731884.html [https://perma.cc/
A7R2-EHRZ] (“The South Korean government is under fire for being reticent to find a lasting
solution to this problem, even though the abuse is continuing today.”).
137. See id.; Vine, supra note 119 (“[At juicy bars], men buy small glasses of supposedly
alcoholic juice for scantily clad ‘juicy girls,’ most of whom have been trafficked from the
Philippines or the former Soviet Union. The rules differ slightly from bar to bar, but basically,
if a man buys enough juice, he can arrange to take a woman out. There’s no explicit exchange
of money for sex at the bar, but once the two are off the premises, a deal is done.”).
138. See WITW Staff, supra note 113 (“Their only escape appears to be securing a
commitment from a soldier, but about 90 percent of the women end up abandoned. It is not
uncommon for them to be left alone when a G.I.’s tour is done, despite being pregnant, or
married.”).
139. See Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, etc., Act No.
7196, Mar. 22, 2004, amended by Act No. 12,349, Jan. 28, 2014 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/
lawView.do?hseq=33012&lang=ENG [https://perma.cc/A5UH-XRMU].
140. See Act on the Prevention of Commercial Sex Acts and Protection, etc. of Victims,
Act No. 12,550, Mar. 27, 2014, amended by Act. No. 14,442, Dec. 20, 2016 (S. Kor.),
translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database, https://
elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=40974&lang=ENG [https://perma.cc/6MYYSGCH].
141. See Ji Hye Kim, Note, Korea’s New Prostitution Policy: Overcoming Challenges to
Effectuate the Legislature’s Intent to Protect Prostitutes from Abuse, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y
J. 493, 494 (2007).
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Following suit, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)142 began to seriously implement
NSPD 22’s zero-tolerance policy, developing a CTIP program that focused
on “increasing awareness, identifying victims, reducing demand, and
cooperating with local authorities.”143 USFK’s comprehensive CTIP
program eventually became a prototype for NATO’s anti-trafficking training
curriculum,144 a testament to its exemplary nature. Additionally, USFK is
cited as a model in the Strategic Action Plan for its great willingness to
cooperate with local authorities on matters relating to sex trafficking.145 To
access information concerning trends in the sex trade industry, USFK
interacts directly with the South Korean government and the Women and
Juveniles Division of the Korean National Police, demonstrating the level of
intergovernmental and interagency cooperation needed to effectively address
the matter.146
In addition to legislative changes, the Seoul Central District Court recently
conceded its government’s heavy involvement in the sex trafficking of
Korean women for U.S. personnel.147 In 2014, more than 120 prostitutes
who were detained and forced to undergo treatment for venereal diseases
filed a lawsuit seeking not only compensation but also a formal government
apology for what they faced in the 1960s and 1970s.148 Sharing her
experience, one former comfort woman explained, “[i]t’s clear that they
treated our venereal diseases not for us but for the American soldiers.”149
The court in 2017 ultimately admitted to the government’s complicity.150
Hailed as a landmark ruling, this decision was the first official
acknowledgement that the legal rights of the women who supplied sexual
services to American military men were violated.151 Although only fiftyseven of the plaintiffs received compensation and the government refused to
issue an apology, the court’s ruling was a step in the right direction for
justice.152
Notwithstanding these victories, sex trafficking around U.S. bases has not
ended. South Korea may have outlawed prostitution in 2004 and USFK may
142. USFK encompasses the entire U.S. armed presence in South Korea. See Ankit Panda,
US Forces Korea Is About to See a Change in Command, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/us-forces-korea-is-about-to-see-a-change-in-command
[https://perma.cc/8PC3-QJGJ].
143. See Trafficking in Persons and International Military Organizations, supra note 60.
144. See id.
145. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 11.
146. See id.
147. See Jeff Kingston, Opinion, ‘Comfort Women’ in South Korea Who Serviced U.S.
Forces Seek Justice, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/
2017/03/04/commentary/comfort-women-south-korea-serviced-u-s-forces-seek-justice
[https://perma.cc/792W-AL7K].
148. See Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Illegally Held Prostitutes Who Catered to G.I.s
Decades Ago, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/
world/asia/south-korea-court-comfort-women.html [https://perma.cc/W7BJ-4V3A].
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. The women plan to appeal the ruling for greater justice. See id.
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have developed a resourceful CTIP program, but these initiatives have only
forced the practice to become even more secretive.153 To restrict its
personnel from continuing to seek illicit sexual services, USFK more strictly
monitors bars and clubs in the camptowns, keeping a vigilant watch for
establishments—specifically juicy bars—involved in trafficking and placing
them off-limits.154 Yet their efforts have an unintended effect.155 Rather
than keeping troops away from these establishments, off-limits lists often
give base personnel ideas about where to find the prostitutes.156 And as for
South Korea, the main problem remains the enforceability of its laws.157 The
country’s legislation has certainly tightened the noose on the sex trade, but
the apathetic and passive enforcement of these laws has stunted any
Even more concerning, perhaps, is that high-ranking
progress.158
government officials and social leaders flout the very laws they create,159
setting a poor precedent for South Korea’s condemnation of the sex trade.
As USFK’s military bases move towards consolidation, the once
flourishing Seoul camptowns are losing critical consumers.160 This,
however, does not mark the end of the sex trade in South Korea. Concerns
are now being raised about the trafficking of women around Camp
Humphreys—a massive new base complex in Pyeongtaek—where most
USFK personnel are being relocated.161 Durebang162 Director Kim Eun-jin
shared her professional perspective on the move, declaring, “I bet there will
153. See Lee Ji-yoon, Sex Trade Still Problem Despite Tough Law, KOREA HERALD (Oct.
1, 2010, 8:48 PM), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20101001000786 [https://
perma.cc/BHN5-GVWZ].
154. See Memorandum from General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, U.S. Army, United States
Forces Korea (USFK) Command Policy Letter #12, Combating Prostitution and Trafficking
in Persons (CTIP) (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/Policyletters/
12_Combating_Prostitution_and_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf?ver=2015-07-30-211909-313
[https://perma.cc/WH57-3SD3]; Jeff Schogol, USFK:
Troops Cannot Pay for the
Companionship of ‘Juicy Girls,’ USA TODAY (Oct. 31, 2014, 9:20 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/10/31/troops-cannot-pay-for-juicygirls/18234191 [https://perma.cc/W3HB-PJRE].
155. See Vine, supra note 119.
156. See id.
157. See Ji-yoon, supra note 153.
158. See id.
159. See id. (“Even high-ranking government officials and social leaders who are required
to lead the anti-prostitution efforts are frequently reported to have been involved in the illegal
sex trade.” (quoting Shin Park Jin-young, president of the human rights center at the Daegu
Women’s Association)).
160. See Anouk Eigenraam, Korea’s ‘Patriotic Prostitutes’ for US Soldiers Get Justice at
Last, ASIA TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/03/article/koreas-patrioticprostitutes-us-soldiers-get-justice-last [https://perma.cc/SW9S-LUZM].
161. See Ko Dong-hwan, Sex Trade Victims’ Guardian Plans to Follow US Troops to
Pyeongtaek, KOREA TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018, 4:11 PM), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/nation/2018/08/177_253124.html [https://perma.cc/PM4U-CZ68] (“Considering the
huge number of people moving into Pyeongtaek―about 85,000, including the Eighth Army,
the Second Infantry Division and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and their
families―the sex trade is almost certain to emerge.”).
162. Durebang is “a welfare agency for women in prostitution in the entertainment districts
near U.S. Forces Korea military camps in Uijeongbu and Dongducheon” that plans “to move
to Pyeongtaek where 90 percent of American forces across South Korea are relocating.” Id.
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be another entertainment district formed near those camps, just as it has been
around American military camps across the country, with all those women
suffering as a result of human trafficking.”163 Unfortunately, this already
appears to be happening. A new off-limits list has been issued for base
personnel stationed at Camp Humphreys, pinpointing establishments
notorious for prostitution and sex trafficking, reminiscent of other
installations in South Korea.164 USFK can hope that making Camp
Humphreys a more family-centered base will help combat the sex trade,165
but the presence of families has never deterred it in the past.166 The problem
is that U.S. military men will continue to solicit the sexual services of women
wherever the base is located167 if a supply is available.
III. RE(SEOUL)UTION AND BEYOND
The economic, political, and cultural entrenchment of U.S. military bases
overseas indicates that there is no simple solution for eradicating sex
trafficking near these military installations. Indeed, South Korea is only one
of the many countries touched by this issue. What is required to ameliorate
the situation is a nuanced and targeted solution specific to each country in
which the United States maintains a military base. Such a solution will
require increased efforts from both the United States and host countries to
eliminate trafficking culture around U.S. overseas military bases. This
section thus proposes a solution for greater cooperation and enforceability in
creating guidelines and signing SOFAs concerning sex trafficking. As
flexible documents that not only necessitate party participation in the
negotiation process but also last indefinitely, SOFAs can provide a workable
and more permanent means through which to promulgate sex trafficking
regulations.
Part III.A discusses the legal feasibility of amending existing SOFAs and
drafting new ones to include provisions regulating sex trafficking. Using the
U.S.-South Korea SOFA as an example, this section explores how
environmental protection—an emerging human rights issue—has long been
incorporated into such agreements.168 This existing precedent should pave
163. Id.
164. See USAG Humphreys Off-Limits, U.S. ARMY GARRISON HUMPHREYS, https://
home.army.mil/humphreys/index.php/about/us-army-garrison-humphreys-and-area-iiilimits-information [https://perma.cc/9WAU-LTJ3] (last updated June 7, 2019, 4:30 AM).
165. See Jon Letman, USAG Humphreys: The Story Behind America’s Biggest Overseas
Base, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 6, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/camp-humphreys-thestory-behind-americas-biggest-overseas-base [https://perma.cc/6NFV-2M2H].
166. Families of U.S. service members began arriving in South Korea as early as the 1960s.
See,
e.g.,
US
Army
Garrison
Yongsan,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
https://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/yongsan.htm [https://perma.cc/RES6-G722] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019).
167. Despite improving relations between North and South Korea, the United States has no
intention of removing its bases from the peninsula. See Hincks, supra note 54. In fact, the
recent emergence of Camp Humphreys as America’s largest overseas military base has only
strengthened the United States and South Korea’s seven-decade military relationship. See id.
168. Jason Strother, The U.S. Military’s Yongsan Garrison Leaves a Mixed Legacy in
Seoul, USA TODAY (Dec. 27, 2017, 6:57 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
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the way for the inclusion of an additional human rights concern in SOFAs:
sex trafficking. Part III.B then considers the practical impact of the solution
and why using SOFAs to combat sex trafficking can have the specific and
desirable effect of severing the connection between sex trafficking and U.S.
military bases overseas.
A. The Legal Feasibility of Including Sex Trafficking Regulations in SOFAs
Recently, there has been increased interest in the debate over whether the
United States should close its foreign military bases altogether, and part of
this discourse stems from the human rights violations being perpetrated by
U.S. personnel overseas.169 The solution to eliminate abuses caused by
overseas military installations is to simply get rid of the bases, which would
severely limit the ability of U.S. military personnel to commit heinous crimes
abroad, including sex trafficking. Yet America’s overseas bases are largely
considered necessary for U.S. foreign policy,170 and countries continue to
solicit military aid from the United States.171 Shutting down U.S. bases
overseas, then, seems impracticable.
A more modest solution is to find a means to prevent the crimes associated
with U.S. base personnel overseas. This can be achieved by modifying the
very agreements that allow overseas bases to exist in the first place: SOFAs.
As contracts, SOFAs may be amended.172 Indeed, the flexibility afforded to
countries in designing and amending SOFAs is advantageous for both
addressing and resolving key issues such as sex trafficking. Based on
negotiations between the United States and host countries, SOFAs are drafted
to anticipate the legal issues that arise when American service members
commit crimes outside of U.S. jurisdiction.173 Additionally, nothing
currently forbids the inclusion of human rights concerns in SOFAs.
Therefore, existing SOFAs must adapt to the changing times.
As an example, South Korea modified its SOFA with the United States to
address environmental concerns after U.S. military personnel dumped toxic
chemicals into the Han River, igniting a storm of protest.174 As one Korean
story/news/world/2017/12/27/u-s-militarys-yongsan-garrison-leaves-mixed-legacyseoul/983602001 [https://perma.cc/8UQG-JFZG].
169. See Jon Glaser, Why We Should Close America’s Overseas Military Bases, TIME (Oct.
7, 2016), http://time.com/4511744/american-military-bases-overseas [https://perma.cc/
BE69-MRZC].
170. See, e.g., id.; Peace Sci. Digest, Overseas Bases Could Do More Harm Than Good,
INKSTICK (Dec. 5, 2017), https://inkstickmedia.com/overseas-bases-harm-good [https://
perma.cc/8LCA-LJGG].
171. See, e.g., Kyle Rempfer, Why Poland Wants a Permanent US Military Base, and Is
Willing to Pay $2 Billion for It, ARMY TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://
www.armytimes.com/news/2018/05/29/why-poland-wants-a-permanent-us-military-baseand-is-willing-to-pay-2-billion-for-it [https://perma.cc/WL7Q-WRFA].
172. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 30, at 1, 7–17 (providing examples of SOFAs that were
subject to amendment).
173. See discussion supra Part I.B.
174. See Youngjin Jung & Jun-Shik Hwang, Where Does Inequality Come From?: An
Analysis of the Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1103, 1113–14 (2003) (“On January 18, 2001, the Korea SOFA was revised for the second
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citizen angrily shared, “[t]he SOFA has allowed American soldiers to get
away with committing offenses here.”175 The event sparked a legal battle176
between the U.S. military and local authorities, resulting in an amended
SOFA.177 The agreement now reads:
The United States Government and the Republic of Korea Government
recognize and acknowledge the importance of environmental protection in
the context of defense activities in the Republic of Korea under the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1953. The United States Government commits itself to
implementing this Agreement in a manner consistent with the protection of
the natural environment and human health, and confirms its policy to
respect relevant Republic of Korea Government environmental laws,
regulations, and standards. The Republic of Korea Government confirms
its policy to implement its environmental laws, regulations, and standards
with due regard for the health and safety of United States personnel.178

The amended agreement reflects a cooperative model that lays out the
responsibilities of both the U.S. and South Korean governments to address
environmental concerns, which were absent in the original SOFA.179 Human
rights issues can similarly be negotiated into SOFAs, especially when they
raise concerns over the actions of American service members and their
resulting impact on the lives of Korean residents.
A SOFA amendment addressing sex trafficking would be similar to one
imposing a responsibility to care for the environment. By adapting the SOFA
to include the environmental amendment, USFK has shown its commitment

time in response to concerns over environmental damage by U.S. military activities . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Don Kirk, U.S. Dumping of Chemical Riles Koreans, N.Y. TIMES (July 15,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/15/news/us-dumping-of-chemical-rileskoreans.html [https://perma.cc/VP6Z-P6CZ]. The United States and Japan have also
supplemented their SOFA regarding environmental regulations, which are framed as a human
rights issue. See Lisa Ferdinando, U.S., Japan Sign Environmental Clarification of Status of
Forces Agreement, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/
Article/Article/620839/us-japan-sign-environmental-clarification-of-status-of-forcesagreement [https://perma.cc/3PB8-282H].
175. See Strother, supra note 168.
176. See Charles Lee, U.S. Army Apologizes for Korean Toxic Dump, UPI (July 24, 2000),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/2000/07/24/US-army-apologizes-for-Korean-toxic-dump/
4678964411200 [https://perma.cc/73V9-DFX8] (“Forty-eight South Korean lawmakers
adopted a statement Monday demanding that the U.S. officers be punished. . . . The
lawmakers also called for a sweeping revision of the controversial Status of Forces Agreement
that sets out the regulatory framework for U.S. troops in Korea.”).
177. See Jennifer Gannon, Student Article, Renegotiation of the Status of Forces
Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 12 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 263, 263–64 (2000) (discussing how the Korean government placed pressure on the
U.S. government to modify the SOFA).
178. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea
Amending the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status
of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea of July 9, 1966, as Amended, S. Kor.U.S., at 1, Jan. 18, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,138.
179. See id.
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to addressing environmental concerns.180 And while the U.S. military has
repeatedly pledged to eradicate sex trafficking,181 it has not similarly
demonstrated its commitment through a SOFA amendment targeting sex
trafficking.
Rather than having multiple unenforceable documents
purporting to address the U.S. military’s sex trafficking crisis, the logical
solution would be to include a sex trafficking provision in one document.
Memorializing such terms in the SOFA itself would allow all policy to exist
in one place and have a specific and targeted solution for the United States
and the host country.
What would ultimately give rise to problems are the differences in the legal
approaches to combatting sex trafficking between the United States and host
countries. Certain crimes that the United States considers particularly
egregious may not be considered so by the local governments, and vice versa.
It is not uncommon for the SOFA to become a hot-button issue after U.S.
personnel allegedly commit crimes in many host countries with large foreign
military presences.182 This is particularly the case when the incident involves
sex crimes and the United States and the host country define the charge
differently.
Considering these differences, it is imperative that each SOFA between
the United States and a host country has its own specialized definition of sex
trafficking. This definition can easily incorporate the definition from the
Palermo Protocol,183 the United States’184 or host country’s definition of sex
trafficking, or a hybrid. Finalizing a definition for sex trafficking will require
extensive negotiations between the United States and the host country, but
cooperation is ultimately key.185 Indeed, the United States has been working
to strengthen its partnership—the “4th P”—with other countries in its
mission to eliminate sex trafficking around the world, as illustrated in its
Strategic Action Plan.186 Working with another country to find a mutually
agreed-upon legal definition for sex trafficking only further promotes the
180. See Strother, supra note 168 (“A statement issued by the public affairs office of United
States Forces Korea says the American military takes ‘environmental protection, human health
and public safety very seriously, and we are committed to responsible environmental
stewardship.’”).
181. See discussion supra Part II.A.
182. See, e.g., Korean Anger as US Soldiers Cleared, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2002, 3:37
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2497947.stm [https://perma.cc/F3HP-KFBN].
183. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 1584(a) (2012) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to
involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for
any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this
section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual
abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.”); see also
Involuntary Servitude, Forced Labor, and Sex Trafficking Statutes Enforced, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/involuntary-servitude-forced-labor-and-sex-trafficking-statutesenforced [https://perma.cc/9M9W-G3XF (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (detailing additional
provisions in the U.S. Code that target sex trafficking).
185. See supra notes 66, 108–10 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the U.S. Strategic Action Plan).
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partnership prong. Because the definition will be written into SOFAs, both
the United States and host countries will be accountable for any violation
against the agreed-upon language. Not only does this stop the United States
from imposing its own sex trafficking legislation on sovereign states but it
also is quintessential of the 4th P.
After formulating a collaborative definition for sex trafficking, there
remains the hurdle of who will prosecute the crime. Once U.S. military
personnel step off base, they are on foreign soil, and the host country may
have the power to prosecute any crimes they commit, depending on the
jurisdictional framework of the SOFA.187 In the spirit of maintaining
peaceful negotiation for an infraction of the sex trafficking provision of the
SOFA, it is impracticable to grant the United States exclusive jurisdiction.188
Instead, the United States and the host country should share jurisdiction over
sex trafficking crimes.189 In this scenario, shared jurisdiction would allow
the host country to have the first opportunity to prosecute the crime. Since
the crime is being committed outside the jurisdictional control of the United
States, the host country should therefore have the power to try the offender.
If the host country declines to exercise jurisdiction, the responsibility of
prosecution will then fall to the United States.
Even if a U.S. soldier is tried by the host country, SOFAs dictate that he
may still be afforded certain guarantees for a fair trial similar to those of
criminal defendants in the United States.190 Indeed, a U.S. soldier is typically
appointed a SOFA representative—“[a]n observer from the same Military
Service as the accused”—to attend his trial and act to protect his
constitutional rights,191 including the right to counsel and the right to an
interpreter.192 While the host country may not recognize an equivalent of
U.S. constitutional rights, the SOFA typically stipulates what rights U.S.
military personnel are entitled to in criminal trials.193 If tried by the United
States, a U.S. soldier is subject to the UCMJ.194 While the United States
remains one of the global leaders in protecting and promoting human
rights,195 the host country should still have primary jurisdiction for the
aforementioned reasons.
187. See discussion supra Part I.B.
188. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of exclusive
jurisdiction. If the sex trafficking crime were to occur on base, which falls under U.S.
jurisdiction, the United States should retain exclusive jurisdiction.
189. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text for a discussion of shared jurisdiction.
190. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 45, at 2 (“The same procedures for safeguarding the
interests of United States personnel subject to foreign jurisdiction shall be applied in so far as
practicable in overseas areas where U.S. Forces are regularly stationed.”).
191. Id. at 4.
192. See Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA], supra note 40.
193. See, e.g., The SOFA and You, U.S. FORCES KOREA (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/I_20160425_The_SOFA_and_You.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6L2-C9KY].
194. See ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34697, SUPREME COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER MILITARY COURT CASES 1 (2009).
195. See United States Key Role in Support of Human Rights, U.S. EMBASSY CZECH,
https://cz.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/usa-and-human-rights
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B. The Practical Impact of Using SOFAs to Combat Sex Trafficking
Around U.S. Military Bases Abroad
The United States has not been able to single-handedly stop the sex
trafficking of women and girls around its military bases overseas. The
presence of U.S. armed forces should not be a contributing factor to crime
that will harm the residents of another nation, especially when they are
stationed overseas to protect that country’s interests. Additionally, the host
country should not be obligated to follow the unilateral laws set by the United
States when it is its own sovereign state and the U.S. military base is on
foreign soil. Allowing the United States and the host country to contribute
to a definition for sex trafficking not only makes both parties more willing to
adhere to their own laws but also entices them to honor the commitment they
made. While an argument could be made that there is the possibility of one
country having greater influence over creating the definition, ultimately both
the United States and the host country must execute the agreement. If one
country is dissatisfied with the terms, it is unlikely to ratify the document
without further negotiation. Therefore, cooperation will ensure a balance
between the two countries’ interests.
The same logic applies to the jurisdictional framework regarding sex
trafficking in SOFAs. Here, the U.S. base exists only because the sovereign
state has allowed its presence and location. The United States should
therefore honor the host country’s choice of whether it wants to prosecute the
crime or relinquish jurisdiction to the United States. If the host country
decides to exercise its jurisdiction, this will serve as a powerful psychological
deterrent to U.S. military personnel seeking to indulge in sex trafficking
because they understand that they may be incarcerated in a foreign prison.196
In any case, if the host country declines jurisdiction, then the United States
will have the opportunity to prosecute the crime itself.
The United States has undeniably demonstrated its commitment to the
global eradication of sex trafficking. But it is not always clear whether the
host country has the same intention. Although the host country should be
inclined to protect its citizens’ human rights, this moral obligation may not
be enough to entice them into incorporating a sex trafficking provision in the
SOFA. If the host country is altogether apathetic to this issue, the United
States could condition its military presence in the state on the host country’s

[https://perma.cc/ZS83-VS9Q] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“The United States today, as two
centuries ago, is a world leader in the ongoing struggle for human rights.”). But see Michael
Posner, Why U.S. Withdrawal from the Human Rights Council Is a Dangerous Leadership
Mistake, FORBES (June 19, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/
2018/06/19/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-un-human-rights-council
[https://perma.cc/XKH8QUFM] (explaining how the United States can no longer be considered the leading champion
of human rights).
196. See, e.g., David Allen, Ex-Marine Decries Nature of Japan Prison Work, STARS &
STRIPES (July 18, 2004), https://www.stripes.com/news/ex-marine-decries-nature-of-japanprison-work-1.21905 [https://perma.cc/G74M-CVHT].
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cooperation regarding sex trafficking.197 The minimum effort that a host
country should contribute would be the drafting of a definition of sex
trafficking for the SOFA, considering that the United States will prosecute
any crime over which the host country declines to exercise jurisdiction.
To replace the United States’ multitudinous SOFAs with various countries,
the United States recently developed a “global SOFA template” to govern its
foreign bases overseas.198 The global SOFA template does not include a sex
trafficking provision but, even if it did, it would be nearly impossible to apply
a global definition to every country. Indeed, a global definition—most likely
drafted by the United States alone—would neither accurately depict nor
resolve how the U.S. military’s sex trafficking crisis affects each country.
For example, a solution designed to target the sex trafficking of women and
girls in South Korea may not work for the type of sex trafficking that occurs
around a military base in a different nation; in this case, one size does not fit
all. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the success of each SOFA that
the document retains its flexibility and is tailored to the needs and conditions
of the host country.
Today, this issue is more pertinent than ever. In a male-dominated world
with a male-dominated culture, the continuous empowerment of women and
girls and the recognition of their autonomy has important implications for the
future.199 Because sex trafficking disproportionately affects women and
girls, the illegal industry not only undermines gender equality but also
perpetuates a culture of toxic masculinity—especially when the solicitation
of sexual services stems from U.S. military men. Indeed, the “macho” male
culture that is often associated with the U.S. military will only continue to be
fed by the exploitation of women and girls who are powerless over their own
bodies. Masculinity is no longer an excuse.
Sex trafficking undoubtedly contributes to the vicious cycle of male
dominance, which is yet another reason why its elimination is of paramount
importance. With respect to the sex trafficking of women and girls around
U.S. military bases overseas, a strong SOFA provision would likely deter
these men from participating in the sex industry and, consequently, prevent
197. See supra note 6 (discussing why host countries desire U.S. military presence). It has
been scientifically proven that better results are achieved when punishment is given rather
than reward. See Gaia Remerowski, Carrot or Stick?: Punishments May Guide Behavior
More Effectively Than Rewards, SOURCE (May 6, 2015), https://source.wustl.edu/2015/05/
carrot-or-stick-punishments-may-guide-behavior-more-effectively-than-rewards
[https://perma.cc/G4LU-LZBD]. The United States could therefore punish the host country
for refusing to comply, such as by reducing the number of military personnel or cutting back
on financial aid.
198. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 5, at 3–5. A standardized SOFA would be
far too rigid for a document that requires flexibility. Id.
199. The empowerment of women has blossomed in the United States following the
#MeToo movement. See, e.g., Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful
Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html
[https://perma.cc/E3UA-7N53]. While the movement continues to gain traction, turning a
blind eye to the sex trafficking of women and girls runs counter to any progress the United
States has made in advancing women’s rights and equality.
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them from reinforcing gender inequality. Additionally, this will further give
decline to a “macho” military culture that, above all, breeds promiscuous
behavior.
CONCLUSION
Right now, there are insufficient procedures in place to permit the vigorous
prosecution of sex trafficking offenses involving U.S. military personnel
overseas. The United States can continue to unilaterally promulgate
legislation and policy, but these one-sided laws will always fail to adequately
address the issue at hand. Existing legislation and policy prove the point.
While the TVPA, NSPD 22, and the Strategic Action Plan all strive to
eliminate sex trafficking, they fall short of being able to grasp the nuances
necessary for the elimination of sex trafficking around the U.S. military bases
located on foreign soil. Here, a sex trafficking solution that works for one
country may not be applicable to another. Therefore, SOFAs can serve as
the fundamental building blocks for the creation of a solution that will sever
the connection between sex trafficking and U.S. military personnel in a
specific host country. The agreed-upon definition of sex trafficking and the
proposed jurisdictional framework underlie the importance of the United
States and the host country working together to effectively target the many
forms of sex trafficking around U.S. military bases. Such a resolution will
ultimately allow the military to state that it finally has a handle on criminal
sexual activities that stem from the actions of its very own personnel,
bringing the United States one step closer to eliminating sex trafficking on a
global scale.

